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ABSTRACT: The broad outlines of US immigration policy date back to the early Cold 
War. One piece of this system is a screening process initially designed to prevent 
infiltration by communist agents posing as migrants from East-Central Europe. I argue 
that the development of these measures was a driven by geopolitical concerns and show 
how these vetting criteria favored the admission of hardline nationalists and 
anticommunists. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I demonstrate that geopolitics 
influenced immigration policy, resulting in the admission of extremist individuals. 
Second, I document how geopolitical concerns and the openness of American institutions 
provided exiles with the opportunity to mobilize politically. While there is little evidence 
that the vetting system succeeded in preventing the entry of communist subversives into 
the US, it did help to create a highly mobilized anticommunist ethnic lobby that 
supported extremist policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the early Cold War. 
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Introduction  
Immigration policy has been a constant theme in American political discourse. 
Since the 2001 attacks of September 11, these debates have focused on the potential of 
terrorists to gain entry into the US by posing as migrants or refugees. However, in the late 
1940s and early 1950s these concerns focused on the displaced persons and migrants 
arriving from Europe. As part of a broader American response to the rise of the Soviet 
Union and the outbreak of the Cold War, policymakers in Washington created a new 
immigration system, which subjected migrants to a screening process to ensure that 
communist agents from East-Central Europe did not infiltrate the country. 
My basic thesis is that the geopolitical concerns H[SUHVVHGLQ$PHULFD¶VSRVWZDU
immigration policy resulted in the systematic selection of hardline nationalists and 
anticommunists from East-Central Europe for admission to the U.S. In addition to 
granting these individuals entry, the same geopolitical factors provided political 
opportunities for exiles from the Eastern bloc to mobilize.1 While there is little evidence 
that the vetting system prevented the entry of communist subversives, I show that it had 
the unintended consequence of creating a cohort of vigorously anticommunist activists. 
After settling in the U.S., these individuals mobilized to create powerful ethnic lobbies 
that sought to push the U.S. towards a hardline policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the 
new communist regimes in their homelands. 
Hannah Arendt, who came to America from Germany as an immigrant herself, was 
among the first to recognize that migrants could be catalysts for conflict diffusion across 
state borders. By 1951 she had already developed an argument demonstrating the role 
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Europe and in the onset of World War II.2 Since then, Douglas Woodwell has confirmed 
and broadened her claims. He argues³International militarized disputes arise when 
ethnic nationalist pressure groups successfully influence state foreign policy in such a 
way that state interests are seen to coincide with ethno-QDWLRQDOJURXSLQWHUHVW´3 Exiles 
can play an important in spreading domestic conflicts beyond the borders of their 
homelands by shaping public opinion in their new host states, promoting international 
intervention and raising money to support continuing warfare.4 
The power of these interest groups has grown with the historical expansion of the 
American pUHVLGHQW¶VDELOLW\WRPDNHXQLODWHUDOSROLF\FKDQJHV during the course of the 
twentieth century. Migrant communities KDYHWDNHQDGYDQWDJHRI³WKLVUHODWLYHO\QHZ
center of policy development in American politics to supplement long-established ties 
ZLWK&RQJUHVVDQGEXUHDXFUDWV´5 Due to their access to the global media and the 
sensitivity of Congress to lobbying, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan claim 
that migrants and diaspora FRPPXQLWLHVKDYHEHFRPH³WKHVLQJOHPRVWimportant 
determinant of policy´ in America.6  
Using the example of postwar migration to the U.S. from East-Central Europe, I 
argue that immigration policy helps to explain the presence of highly unified, politically 
mobilized ethnic lobbies in postwar America. At the start of the Cold War, the United 
States was faced with an unprecedented refugee crisis in Europe. In response to the 
geopolitical situation, the government created an immigration system that allowed 
extremely anticommunist ± in some cases even fascist ± migrants from East-Central 
Europe to enter the country. The newly-arrived exiles from the Eastern bloc mobilized 
quickly, forming uncompromising lobbies that opposed any form of cooperation or 
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détente with the USSR. While promoting national ideals, they called for their homelands 
to be granted political freedom and independence. 
I explain the rapid mobilization of these anticommunist ethnic lobbies in two steps. 
First, I argue that the fear of Soviet infiltration led to the creation of an immigration 
apparatus that systematically granted visas to extremist individuals. The evidence 
contained in government documents and congressional hearings shows how the United 
States created a screening process that gave preference to individuals who espoused 
hardline anticommunist views. The legislatively mandated vetting procedures designed to 
keep communist agents out of the United States systematically skewed the political views 
of the individuals granted entry into the country (see Figure 1). This model demonstrates 
the role immigration policy plays in distorting the composition of migrant communities 
by favoring individuals with certain characteristics. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In the second step, I show that the effects of this migration procedure were 
amplified by government policies that sought to make use of exiles in the nascent Cold 
War. The same geopolitical concerns that led to the creation of the vetting procedures 
DOVRFUHDWHGWKH³GLPHQVLRQVRIRSSRUWXQLW\´WKDWHQDEOHGWKHLUSROLWLFL]DWLRQ7 Through 
the 1950s a number of American policies sought to take advantage of immigration from 
East-Central Europe WRRSHQZKDW*HRUJH.HQQDQ¶VPolicy Planning Staff called ³DZLGH
EUHDFKLQWKH,URQ&XUWDLQ´8 For example, the government sought to utilize exiles by 
forming them into a Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC), who would fight to liberate their 
homelands. The VFC and similar initiatives unintentionally gave migrants, who had 
already been radicalized by their postwar experience of communism in their homelands, a 
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political ear.9 When the government later abandoned these plans, it was surprised by the 
strength of exile opposition and even had to warn its agencies to resist the pressure of this 
highly mobilized ethnic lobby. 
The proposals for the VFC and other initiatives of this kind are crucial to our 
understanding of the postwar era EHFDXVHWKH\³emerged as the United States was still 
developing most of the security and foreign policy instruments on which it relied 
WKURXJKRXWWKH&ROG:DU´10 Given the changes involved in reorganizing the American 
immigration system in the aftermath of World War II,11 as well as the stickiness of policy 
legacies, many of these measures continue to affect U.S. policy ± and debates about 
vetting and immigration ± to this day.12 Examining how these policies were developed in 
the context of the early Cold War can therefore shed light on the present. 
Focusing on the mobilization of migrants from East-Central Europe in the early 
Cold War allows me to study mobilization as a byproduct of geopolitics.13 Much of the 
literature suggests that immigration policy is a bottom-up process dominated by local 
interests and ethnic identities.14 By contrast, I add a systemic perspective to the debate by 
suggesting that immigration policy and mobilization are primarily the products of state 
responses to the international system. Although the geopolitical context has changed 
since the early days of the Cold War, the enduring legacy of the postwar changes to U.S. 
immigration policy give this topic contemporary significance as well. 
My argument proceeds systematically. First, I explain my focus on the early Cold 
War and examine how much influence these exiles had on American policy after the 
Second World War. I also present my theoretical framework, define key terms and 
outline my empirical approach. In the second section, I summarize the refugee situation 
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in Europe and outline the process through which individuals from East-Central Europe 
immigrated to the United States. Third, by examining the vetting procedures used by 
immigration officials, I show how hardline anticommunist refugees were selected from 
the pool of potential migrants. Fourth, I detail how American foreign policy goals that 
relied on the presence of an active émigré community encouraged the political 
mobilization of immigrants from East-Central Europe. I conclude by reflecting on the 
continuing importance of immigration policy in explaining the influence of political 
exiles on foreign policy. 
 
Migration Policy and the Cold War 
Focusing on migration from East-Central Europe after 1945 may seem somewhat 
esoteric given the more active scholarly interest in other migrant communities, such as 
the Cuban diaspora and the so-called the Israeli Lobby.15 However, migration from the 
newly communist states of the Eastern bloc dominated a ³dynamic era in U.S. foreign 
and defense policy´ at the beginning of the Cold War.16 This example has garnered 
renewed attention after the release of a Justice Department report in 2006 detailing how 
$PHULFDQLQWHOOLJHQFHFUHDWHGD³VDIHKDYHQ´IRU1D]LVDQGWKHLUFROODERUDWRUVDIWHU
World War II.17 The fact that the archival records relating to this wave of migration have 
been declassified also allows insight into the thinking and motivations of policymakers 
that is not available in other, more recent cases. Lastly, this temporal distance makes it 
possible to track the full effects of the vetting process designed to prevent communist 
infiltration. 
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The anticommunist migrants from East-Central Europe mobilized soon after their 
arrival and quickly began to lobby the U.S. government on behalf of what they perceived 
to be their homeland interests. The evidence suggests that they were quite effective in 
doing so.18 For example, 7RQ\6PLWKREVHUYHV³'XULQJWKH&ROG:DU$PHULFDQOLEHUDOV
typically lamented the visceral anticommunism of East European ethnic groups as an 
LPSHGLPHQWWREHWWHUUHODWLRQVZLWK0RVFRZ´He argues that Henry Kissinger lost 
FRQVLGHUDEOHLQIOXHQFHLQWKH5HSXEOLFDQ3DUW\DIWHU5RQDOG5HDJDQ¶VHOHFWLRQLQ
due to the backlash from this lobby, which saw détente as a betrayal of U.S. promises.19 
Arguing along similar lines, Yossi Shain contends that U.S.-Soviet differences 
could have been resolved earlier had it not been for the steady pressure of American 
descendants from East-Central Europe, who rejected anything that fell short of 
unconditional freedom for their homelands.20 Through much of the postwar period 
$PHULFD¶VDYHUVLRQWRFRPPXQLVPUHLQIRUFHGWKHYLHZVRIthe hardline anticommunist 
views of many migrants. This encouraged the activities of East-Central European lobbies 
in the United States, which raised funds to promote regime change.21 However, as the 
United States later sought to improve relations with the east, ethno-nationalist agitation 
was discouraged. In some cases the CIA even acquiesced to the activity of foreign agents 
intended to silence dissident voices in the United States.22 
Despite this evidence, the overall impact of this anticommunist lobby on U.S. 
policy is hard to determine. In part, this is due to the fact that ³WKHLPSDFWRI86
diasporic communities on the demise of communism in Eastern Europe has been 
DFFXPXODWLYHUDWKHUWKDQGLUHFW´23 In trying to draw attention to the connection between 
geopolitics, immigration policy and immigrant mobilization, I focus on the causes of 
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migrant mobilization, not its effectiveness. The existing literature and the archival 
evidence I provide establish that these individuals mobilized quickly and broadly after 
their immigration to the United States. 
Mobili]DWLRQLVXVXDOO\GHILQHGLQWHUPVRIDFRPPXQLW\¶VDELOLW\WRFRRUGLQDWHLWV
members, select spokespersons and engage in collective action.24 Drawing on this basic 
definition, I use governmental documents to show how organizations created by migrants 
from East-Central Europe lobbied the U.S. government. These records show that these 
dissidents took on an active role in politics soon after their arrival in the United States 
and that they quickly obtained access to the upper channels of government. 
There are a number of explanations for the differing levels of political mobilization 
among ethnic communities.25 First, the nature of exit is an important variable. While 
VRPHPLJUDQWVFKRRVHWROHDYHYROXQWDULO\UHIXJHHVDUHRIWHQ³SXVKHG´RXWRIWKHLU
homelands as a result of fear for their lives and livelihood.26 Those who are forced to 
leave are more likely to mobilize politically than those who leave to pursue economic 
opportunities abroad. Second, given the costs of mobilization, the resources available to 
migrants (often tied to their economic success) are also important in determining the 
politically activity of diasporas.27 Third, the ability to mobilize may depend on 
UHFHSWLYLW\LHKRZWKHQRUPVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\³ILW´ZLWKWKRVHRIWKHKRVWVWDWH.28 
While helpful, these explanations are not satisfactory on their own. Resource-based 
arguments do not predict the political direction (for simplicity, from left to right) of 
mobilization. Economic arguments can often account for mobilization in regard to tax 
policy, labor and other domestic issues better than for its foreign policy views and the 
FRPPXQLW\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRLWVKRPHODQG:KLOHWKHQDWXUHRIH[LWPD\SUHGLFW
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mobilization, it does not explain how and why large numbers of migrants end up in the 
same host state. Additionally, rHFHSWLYLW\LVJHQHUDOO\DQDO\]HGLQWHUPVRI³VRFLHWDO
VHFXULW\´PHDVXUHGE\FXOWXUDOGLVWDQFHQRWRQWKHSROLWLFDORSSRUWXQLWLHVSUHVHQWHGE\
geopolitical situation.29  
The basic problem is that these existing explanations take the composition of 
immigrant communities as given. I push the explanation of mobilization back a step by 
treating selection as a variable instead of a constant.30 The vetting conducted by the 
United States played a crucial role in selecting hardline anticommunist individuals for 
admission into the country. The admission of D³YLFWLPGLDVSRUD´ZLWKSUHH[LVWLQJ, 
extremist political views, whose members are shaped by their flight from the regime in 
their homelands, is potentially dangerous for host states.31 These experiences help to 
H[SODLQWKHDFWLYLW\RIH[LOHVLQKRPHODQGSROLWLFVVLQFHWKH\LQFUHDVH³WKHLULQFOLQDWLRQRU
PRWLYDWLRQWRPDLQWDLQWKHLUVROLGDULW\DQGH[HUWJURXSLQIOXHQFH´32 Additionally, the 
trauma of exile creates a psychological void that can make political migrants easy prey 
for extremism.33 
The second stage of my argument bears some resemblance to the existing 
explanations stressing receptivity. However, I focus on the ³political opportunity 
structures´ presented to migrants upon their arrival in the United States, not on cultural 
distance. Following Sidney Tarrow, I argue that WKH³GLPHQVLRQVRIWKHSROLWLFDO
HQYLURQPHQW«provide incentives (or disincentives) for people to undertake collective 
action E\DIIHFWLQJWKHLUH[SHFWDWLRQVIRUVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUH´34 After 1945, concerns about 
the Soviet Union facilitated the collective action of anticommunist migrants from East-
Central Europe. Exiles from communist Europe were able to take advantage of the 
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openness and vulnerability of U.S. institutions (particularly Congress) to lobbying and 
the presence of influential allies within the government and the national security 
establishment, who shared their views about communism and the Soviet Union.35 
Unlike many other studies of exiles and refugees, I take a transnational perspective.  
Following the policy of the U.S. government at the time, I treat postwar anticommunist 
émigrés as a single group. This perspective reflects the important role that these migrants 
played in the propaganda war between the United States and the USSR at the start of the 
Cold War. It also emphasizes the shared anticommunism of these groups and their 
cooperation in seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy towards East-Central Europe. 
 
Postwar Migration to the United States from East-Central Europe 
In 1945 there were over 7,000,000 Eastern and Central European refugees in 
Western Europe. Some had been moved there by the Nazis to serve as laborers. Others 
had been living in the West as students, tourists, businessmen or workers. The majority 
had fled west during the war to escape hostilities in their homelands.36 
The mass of refugees, displaced and stateless people in Western Europe after the 
war posed a problem for the Allies, who were bound by the Treaty of Yalta to repatriate 
³6RYLHWFLWL]HQV´EDFNWRWKH8665Dfter the war. The western alliance adopted a broad 
interpretation of the agreement. US General (and later President) Dwight D. Eisenhower 
ZURWHLQ³7KHVHGLVSODFHGSHUVRQVDUHDconstant source of misunderstanding on 
controversial discussion with representatives of the Soviet Military Mission«. The only 
complete solution to this problem from all points of view is the early repatriation of these 
>LQGLYLGXDOV@´37 Repatriation lessened the costs of caring for and feeding these masses at 
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a time when food and other supplies were running low while also preserving the alliance 
with the Soviets. 
In the end, the military forces of the Allies and the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration repatriated about 5,500,000 of the 7,000,000 East-Central 
European refugees living in Western Europe. The International Refugee Organization 
took charge of the remainder. By the time these organizations finished their repatriation 
and resettlement programs, only about 100,000 refugees who had fled the Nazis during 
the war were left under Allied control.38 
Despite these efforts, refugee flows to Western Europe did not stop with the end of 
WKHZDU0DQ\LQGLYLGXDOVIURPDUHDV³OLEHUDWHG´by the Red Army now sought to avoid 
new persecution by the Soviets.39 By 1952 more than 18,000 people had escaped from 
communist Europe. Unlike the first wave of migrants who had fled fascism, this 
population was broadly anticommunist. Many had played an active role within the Nazi 
wartime client regimes as administrators, policemen, officials, or even as soldiers. Once 
in power the communists imprisoned and executed many Nazi sympathizers on charges 
of collaboration. Anyone who had not actively resisted the Nazi occupation was in 
danger. 
The continued flow of individuals from communist Europe meant that the refugee 
camps in the west were not shrinking as planned. In order to relieve the pressure on its 
allies in Western Europe and take advantage of the skills and increasing psychological 
YDOXHRI(DVWHUQEORFGHIHFWRUVWKH³OHJDOVWDWXWHVDQGLQVWUXPHQWV>RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV@
ZHUHKDVWLO\UHFRQILJXUHGWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHVHSUL]HGLQGLYLGXDOV¶HQWUDQFHWR$PHULFD7KLV
entailed parallel adjustments WRGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´40 
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These changes to the immigration legislation of the United Sates were part of a 
EURDGHUSROLF\RI³FDOFXODWHGNLQGQHVV´RQWKHSDUWRIWKH7UXPDQDQG(LVHQKRZHU
administrations.41 Although America began accepting individuals from East-Central 
Europe immediately after the war, migration to the United States started in earnest with 
the admission of this second, anticommunist wave of refugees. This corresponded with 
the passage of the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of 1948, which  ³DXWKRUL]H>G@for a 
limited period of time the admission into the United States of certain European displaced 
SHUVRQVIRUSHUPDQHQWUHVLGHQFHDQGIRURWKHUSXUSRVHV´42 
The admission of so many émigrés from East-Central Europe into the US did not 
go unnoticed domestically. ESLVRGHVOLNH2NVDQD.DVHQNLQD¶VKLJKO\SXEOLFL]HG³OHDSIRU
IUHHGRP´IURPWKHWKLUGIORRUZindow of the Soviet consulate in New York City in 
August 1948 made escapees hard to ignore.43 The Policy Planning Staff observed that the 
storLHVRIHVFDSHHVKDGGRQHPRUH³WRDURXVHWKH:HVWHUQ:RUOGWRWKHUHDOLWLHVRIWKH
nature of communist tyranny than anythLQJHOVHVLQFHWKHHQGRIWKHZDU´44 
From an international perspective, the DPA was a response to rising tensions with 
the USSR at the start of the Cold War. The Communist coup in Hungary in the spring of 
1947, followed by the Czechoslovak coup in February 1948 and the Berlin Blockade 
starting in June 1948, convinced American policymakers that the United States had to 
take a harder line against the Soviet Union. Following the creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, President Truman announced a propaganda offensive 
WKDWVRXJKWWRZLQWKH³VWUXJJOHIRUWKHPLQGVRIPHQ.´Exiles with firsthand knowledge 
of the situation behind the Iron Curtain ZRXOGKHOSE\³JHWWLQJWKHUHDOVWRU\DFURVVWR
SHRSOHLQRWKHUFRXQWULHV´45 
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With the election of Eisenhower in 1952, a more ³DJJUHVVLYHUROOEDFN´RI
communism appeared to be in the offing. This was signaled by John )RVWHU'XOOHV¶V
SURPLVHRIDQ³DQH[SORVLYHDQGG\QDPLF´SROLF\RIliberation. Although Eisenhower 
was initially skeptical of this more aggressive approach, many of his aids, including his 
chief national security advisor, C.D. Jackson, supported it wholeheartedly.46  Eventually 
the Eisenhower aGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V³DJJUHVVLYHUROOEDFN´came to include plans to create an 
army of exiles who would fight to liberate their homelands. 
Regardless of how Truman and Eisenhower sought to take advantage of escapees, 
the problem of east to west migration in Europe needed to be addressed. By 1952 the 
Mutual Security Agency estimated that the rate of flight from behind the Iron Curtain had 
increased to 1,000 a month.47 In response to this, the deputy director of the Agency urged 
&RQJUHVVWRFRQVLGHU³WKHWKUHDWWKLV>(XURSHDQVXUSOXV-population] poses to political 
VWDELOLW\´48 As a result, the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) was extended repeatedly before 
expiring in 1954. 
The U.S. government was happy to accept these immigrants, since many of them 
SRVVHVVHGLPSRUWDQWVNLOOV³>7@KHFDOLEHURIWKHH[SHOOHHLVVXFKDVWRPDNHWKHPUDWKHU
desirable immigrants into the United States. In other words, they are not left-overs. The 
expellees we can choose from, and we can choose those whom we need in this 
FRXQWU\´49 Intellectuals and businessmen had been targeted by the communist regime 
due to their bourgeois background. Others were experienced craftsmen and farmhands 
deemed necessary to maintain the growth of the postwar American economy. 
The DPA was only the first in a series of actions taken by Congress to bring 
refugees from World War II to the United States. The government found so many of the 
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pPLJUpVWREH³GHVLUDEOH´WKDWLWNHSWH[SDQGLQJLPPLJUDWLRQTXRWDVIRU(DVW-Central 
Europe.50 $-XVWLFH'HSDUWPHQWUHSRUWQRWHV³&RQJUHVV¶RYHUULGLQJFRQFHUQDWWKHWLPH
ZDVLQKHOSLQJUHIXJHHVHVFDSH&RPPXQLVWUXOH´51 These exiles were important not only 
because of their skills, but also as pieces in the growing conflict with the USSR. 
According to a report from the Department of State, granting these individuals entry was 
part of a broader U.S. plan to pressure on the Soviet Union in three different ways: 
 
I. Emphasizing to Soviet rulers and peoples the reckless nature of 
Soviet policy and its consequences. 
II. Establishing a reservoir of good will between the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R. and those of the free world. 
III. Widening the schism which exists between the Soviet peoples and 
their rulers.52 
 
As an administrator at the Mutual Security Agency explained, ³2QHRIWKHEHVW
ways to keep alive faith in freedom and democracy behind the iron curtain is to let the 
people enslaved by communism know that those who make the dangerous flight to safety 
will find refuge in the west and will be given an opportunity to sWDUWDQHZOLIH´53 
Individuals who had escaped from East-Central Europe after the war were frequently 
hired by Radio Free Europe or had their stories told on programs broadcast back into 
their homelands.54  This propaganda battle was so important that the United States was 
unwilling to deport anyone for fear of the negative publicity this would generate in the 
communist bloc.55 
Due to the economic advantages of some and the strategic position of others, 
refugees from communist Europe comprised nearly half of all immigrants admitted to the 
United States between 1945 and 1955.56 Most of those who had fled during the war were 
classified as refugees, stateless or displaced persons. Those expelled by or fleeing 
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communism after the end of the war required a new category. While sometimes referred 
WRDVH[SHOOHHVRUSROLWLFDODV\OHHVWKHJRYHUQPHQWVRRQFRLQHGWKHWHUP³HVFDSHHV´
When used within government documents and acts of Congress, 
µ(VFDSHH¶PHDQVDQ\SHUVRQZKR«DIWHU:RUOG:DU,,KDVOHIt the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics or other Communist, Communist-dominated, or 
Communist-occupied area of Europe, including those parts of Germany 
under military occupation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
who because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, or political opinion refuses to return thereto and who has not been 
permanently resettled.57 
 
7RGD\LWLVDWUXLVPWKDW³refugees can become pawns in global power struggles, 
and refugee assistance can be usHGWRGLVFUHGLWDQRSSRQHQW´58 However, at this time, 
migration was just one front in the geopolitical battle between the United States and the 
USSR. Regardless of which program the immigrants from East-Central Europe entered 
the United States under, they were all subject to a thorough screening process that Acting 
Secretary of State Gen. Walter Bendell Smith called ³HYHQPRUHULJRURXVWKDQWKDWZKLFK
DSSOLHVXQGHUQRUPDOLPPLJUDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV´59 
 
Screening Communists Out (and Anticommunists In) 
Although the US government saw clear economic and political advantages to 
admitting desirable immigrants, there was also great concern about the possibility of 
FRPPXQLVW³VXEYHUVLYHV´LQILOWUDWLQJWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$IRUPHURIILFHUIURPWKH&KLHI
of Military Intelligence (G-2) stationed in Berlin after the war noted that by the fall of 
KHDQGKLVFROOHDJXHVKDGEHFRPH³FRQYLQFHGZLWKDGHTXDWHHYLGHQFHWKDW
GHOLEHUDWHDWWHPSWVZHUHEHLQJPDGHE\WKH6RYLHW*RYHUQPHQW«>WRVHQGagents] to the 
United States, to South America and to Canada under the guise of being displaced 
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SHUVRQVRUEHLQJSROLWLFDOUHIXJHHV´60 
In order to combat infiltration by communist agents, Congress authorized the 
executive branch to set up a system to screen all individuals eligible for immigration to 
America. The vetting process was instituted in response to article 13 of the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, which required immigration officials were required to ensure that 
QRYLVDVZHUHJUDQWHGWRDQ\LQGLYLGXDO³ZKRLVRUKDVEHHQDPHPEHU of, or participated 
in, any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of 
JRYHUQPHQWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´61 Based on this and the legislative mandate included in 
other DP laws, the agencies responsible for overseeing the postwar immigration to the 
U.S. gradually developed a screening system to ensure the both the eligibility and 
desirability of migrants seeking entrance into the U.S. 
A number of different agencies participated in carrying out the required 
investigation. First, the International Refugee Organization carried out a background 
check of the individuals before they were even considered for eligibility. Next, the 
information sheet was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which 
made a check against their records. In his testimony before Congress, the Chairman of the 
DP &RPPLVVLRQQRWHGWKDW³LWLVVXUSULVLQJKRZPXFK>)%,DJHQWV@NQRZDERXWSHRSOH
WKDWKDYHQHYHUHYHQVHHQWKHVHVKRUHV´62 
This was followed by a month-long investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps 
of the US Army, which was assisted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The 
background check included: an interview with three neighbors; obtaining a good-conduct 
certificate from local police, camp officer or other authority to establish that the 
individual had not been convicted of any crimes; cross-checking to see if the individual 
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was ever associated with any party/organization hostile to the United States; a fingerprint 
check of local records for subversive activity; and multiple rounds of individual 
interrogation. The State Department also conducted a full inquiry before handing the case 
off to a case analyst at the DP Commission. By the end of the process, the case analysts 
had an extensive file on every potential migrant.63 
As a result of this thorough background check, the DP camps in Western Europe 
became what Susan Carruthers GHVFULEHVDV³PDQXIDFWRULHVRIHYLGHQFH´64 Throughout 
the numerous authentication interviews, the burden of proof was always on the migrants 
to esWDEOLVKWKHLUHOLJLELOLW\DQGSURYHWKHLU³SROLWLFDOGHVLUDELOLW\´65 The applicants had to 
establish that that neither they nor anyone in their family had ever been a member of any 
party or organization hostile to the United States. They were required to account for each 
month of their life, corroborated by character statements. Consular officers were 
instructed to aFWZLWKFDXWLRQEDUULQJDQ\RQHIURPHQWU\³LI>WKHLQWHUYLHZHU@KDVD
UHDVRQDEOHGRXEWWKDWWKH\DUHSROLWLFDOO\LQDGPLVVLEOH´66 
By all accounts, the officers conducting the required interrogations took their jobs 
very seriously. A relief agency official who witnessed the interrogations described the 
consular interviewers DV³FDVH-KDUGHQHG´ZLWK³QRPRUHWHDUVQRPRUHSLW\IRUWKHLU
IHOORZPDQ´+HQRWHGWKDWWKHHVFDSHHVDUH³WUHDWHGLQVXFKDPDQQHUDVWRPDNHWKHP
ZRQGHUZKHWKHUWKHIUHHZRUOGLVWKHLUIULHQG´67 Although about two thirds of the 
individuals rejected by the screening process appealed to the DP Commission or tried to 
get back into the system at a different camp under a different name, only one or two 
percent succeeded in having their status changed.68 In total, the screening took four to six 
weeks. It was so thorough and time-consuming that it often caused a backlog. In many 
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cases, the camps filled less than two thirds of their allotted visas, as migrants were not 
being screened quickly enough.69 
During oversight hearings, members of Congress frequently expressed concerns 
about the effectiveness of the vetting procedures. Some outsiders, such as the chairman of 
the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion, expressed their 
VNHSWLFLVPDUJXLQJ³>,@WLVFRPSOHWHO\DQGXWWHUO\LPSRVVLEOHWRVFUHHQ>HVFDSHHV@´70 
This was a legitimate concern. The situation in the camps was chaotic. Although Nazi 
Germany kept meticulous records on the political activities of individuals under its 
occupation, the growing conflict with the Soviet Union meant that many of the records 
were not accessible or were incomplete. There is considerable evidence that the screening 
apparatus was inadequate for catching communist infiltrators, since agents from the 
Eastern bloc expected to be screened and were prepared for it. In fact, in their search for 
³WKRVHWKDWPHDVXUHGXSWRWKHKLJKHVWSK\VLFDOPHQWDOPRUDODQGideological American 
VWDQGDUGV´WKH8.S. interrogators probably turned away more eligible individuals, who 
did not express their anticommunism ardently enough for the interrogators, than actual 
communist agents.71 
Despite these problems, immigration officials were able to convince Congress that 
³WKHVHFXULW\FKHFNLVDVDGHTXDWHDVLWFDQEHXQGHUWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV´72 Regardless of 
LWVVXFFHVVLQEORFNLQJWKHHQWU\RI³VXEYHUVLYHV´WKHV\VWHPXQGRXEWHGO\DIIHFWHGWKH
general composition of the migrant community granted immigration visas to the United 
States after World War II. In many cases it was easier for erstwhile fascists to enter the 
country than those with more moderate political views. Members of the Nazi party were 
officially ineligible for admission to the United States, since the Nazi party was classified 
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DV³DQRUJDQL]DWLRQKRVWLOHWRWKH86´+RZHYHUWKHFKDQJHGJHRSROLWLFDOVLWXDWLRQPHDQW
that Nazi affiliations were often overlooked if the individual had other redeeming 
characteristics. For example, the United States recruited many Nazi scientists and 
intelligence agents at the start of the Cold War.73 In other cases, serious war criminals 
were given immigration visas because of their language skills, local knowledge and 
anticommunism. 
Although immigration officials were instructed to ignore the requests of prominent 
Nazi war criminals, they helped many others bypass the vetting process.74 By the mid-
1950s this kind of ³EOHDFKLQJ´ZDVQRORQJHUQHFHVVDU\DVLQYHVWLJDWLRQVFDUULHGRXWE\
the CIA only had to ensure WKDW³QRGHURJDWRU\LQIRUPDWLRQ´H[LVWHG6LQFHWKH1D]LSDUW\
was anticommunist, information that an individual had been a Nazi or a member of 
another fascist organization was not considered an impediment. Although it is unclear 
KRZPDQ\³1D]LSHUVHFXWRUV´ZHUHDGPLWWHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKHVHSURJUDPVDQGDQ
immigration system that focused on ferreting out communist agents, the government 
estimate of 10,000 is broadly reported.75 
In trying to prevent communist infiltrators and subversives from entering the 
country, the government ended up selecting hardline, anticommunist individuals for 
admission, including a number of individuals that had been active Nazi persecutors. This 
selection bias, along with the self-conscious attempts by the government to mobilize 
these individuals directly against the communist regimes in East-Central Europe upon 
their arrival in the country, helps to explain their high degree of political mobilization. 
 
Mobilizing Escapees in the United States 
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In the early period of increased migration to the US from East-Central Europe 
starting in 1948, the U.S. government and the Truman administration had seen the 
escapees as part of a propaganda battle with the USSR. However, the new Eisenhower 
administration began to change the role of the escapee in 1953 as part of its ³DJJUHVVLYH
rollback of communism.´ The supporters of this policy hoped to take advantage of the 
politically mobilized migrants from East-Central Europe to form an émigré army. In a 
VHFUHWPHPRUDQGXPIURP3UHVLGHQW(LVHQKRZHUZURWH³,QWKHLQWHUHVWRIRXU
national security, the burden now resting upon the youth of America in the world struggle 
DJDLQVW&RPPXQLVPVKRXOGEHUHOLHYHGE\SURYLGLQJDGGLWLRQDOFRPEDWPDQSRZHU´,Q
RUGHUWRGRWKLVKHDUJXHG³:HVKRXOGILQGDZD\WRPRELOL]HWKHZLOOWRRSSRVH
Communism which exists in countries under the Communist yoke. One way to meet 
these objectives is . . . >WKH@SURSRVDOIRUDµ9ROXQWHHU)UHHGRP&RUSV¶´76  
Loosely based on the Free French Forces organized to oppose the Vichy regime in 
occupied France, the Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC) was conceptualized as a military 
organization for exiles from East-Central Europe to join the fight to liberate their 
homelands. It was a response to earlier offers such as that of Polish General :áDG\VáDZ 
Anders, who promised over six million men to fight with the U.S. for the anti-Soviet 
cause in 1951.77 Although this was not the first attempt to create an émigré army to fight 
communism, it was the only one that received explicit support from the president. In the 
view of the administration, giving escapees an opportunity to fight for their homelands 
would help the United States in its battle against communism and encourage continued 
emigration from East-Central Europe. In the words of C.D. Jackson, the opportunity to 
KHOSWKH:HVWLQWKH&ROG:DUZRXOGJLYHHVFDSHHV³VRPHWKLQJWRKDQJRQWR´78 
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In 1951, Representative Charles J. Kersten introduced an amendment to the Mutual 
Security Act proposing the creation of national legions of escapees associated with the 
1RUWK$WODQWLF7UHDW\2UJDQL]DWLRQ1$72+HDUJXHG³-XVWLPDJLQe that the United 
States had been taken over by the Communists, and there were 100,000 young Americans 
available for military service outside the country. What a magnetic force that would be 
for the eventual liberation of this country. The same situation exists in Poland, in 
+XQJDU\LQ5XPDQLDDQGLQ%XOJDULD´79 
The so-called Kersten Amendment led to proposals for the Volunteer Freedom 
Corps. While President Eisenhower initially hoped to recruit an army of 250,000 
escapees, other groups within the administration questioned his optimism. CIA Director 
$OOHQ:'XOOHVQRWHGWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKRXOGDYRLG³RYHUHQWKXVLDVPDWWKHVWDUW´
aiming instead for the more realistic figure of about 30,000.80 Detailed plans were made 
for the organization of national units affiliated with NATO. A whole range of issues were 
discussed, including the use of national insignia, flags and command structure. There was 
even some debate about expanding the Volunteer Freedom Corps to fight in Korea.81 The 
U.S. DPEDVVDGRUWRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVHYHQUHPDUNHG³>(@VFDSHHVFDQJLYHWKH86WKH
initiative in psychological warfare, and can be the biggest, single, constitutive, creative 
HOHPHQWLQRXUIRUHLJQSROLF\´82 
Despite the promise seen in the VFC by President Eisenhower and many senior 
security officials, the escapee army was never implemented. There are a number of 
reasons for this. In the first place, the USSR reacted strongly to the Kersten Amendment 
LQWKH81FRQGHPQLQJWKH³WKHDSSURSULDWLRQRf 100 million dollars to pay for the 
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recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, 
&]HFKRVORYDNLD+XQJDU\5RPDQLD%XOJDULD>DQG@$OEDQLD´83  
By themselves the objections of the USSR would not have been enough to scuttle 
(LVHQKRZHU¶VSODQVIRUWKH9)&+RZHYHUWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZDVDOVR unable to 
overcome lingering reservations in the State Department and objections from some of its 
allies in Western Europe. Most notably, for the leadership the newly created western 
*HUPDQ)HGHUDO5HSXEOLFDQGRWKHU86DOOLHVDORQJWKH,URQ&XUWDLQ³WKHSURVSHFWRI
housing units of recruits itching for World War III was morHDODUPLQJWKDQUHDVVXULQJ´
&DUUXWKHUVSRLQWVRXWWKDW³ZLWKRXWWKHVXSSRUWRIWKRVHVWDWHVLQZKLFK>WKH9)&¶V@XQLWV
ZRXOGEHEDVHGQRWKLQJ«FRXOGEHGRQH´84 
Finally, the gradual thaw that followed Stalin¶VGHDWKLQ convinced the 
government that the VFC ZDVQRWYDOXDEOHHQRXJKWRULVNHQGDQJHULQJ$PHULFD¶V 
improving relations with the USSR. The suppression of the East German uprising by 
Soviet troops later that year also ³VKDWWHUHGWKHQRWLRQRIDQDJJUHVVLYHUROOEDFN´85 By 
this point, Dulles and others within the Eisenhower administration had begun to question 
this strategy as too costly and too risky. By 1955, Dulles told the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Senate that ³WKH86LVJHWWLQJFORVHUWRDUHODWLRQVKLS>ZKHUH@ZHFDQ
deal [with the Soviet Union] on a basis comparable to that where we deal with 
differences between IULHQGO\QDWLRQV´86 This was the death-knell of the VFC. Although 
some escapees had been recruited into the U.S. Army and were already in training, the 
administration officially rescinded the proposals for a VFC in 1960, incorporating the 
existing escapees into regular Army units.87 
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The escapees and refugee organizations representing exiles from Eastern and 
Central Europe were disappointed when government programs to fight communism were 
abandoned. They had lobbied Congress hard in support of the VFC and other 
anticommunist measures.88 These émigrés saw themselves as the perfect soldiers to lead 
the fight against communism. They had written many letters to the president and to their 
representatives in Congress promising to do anything to defeat the communists. In many 
cases, exiles succeeded in penetrating and forming relationships with the American 
political elite.89 
By the time the plans for the VFC were abandoned, the political support given to 
forming an army of émigrés had already encouraged the escapees from East-Central 
(XURSHWRIRUP³UHIXJHH-ZDUULRUFRPPXQLWLHV´90 As a result, they began to mobilize and 
create their own organizations to fight for the freedom of their homelands. For example, a 
group of veterans of the Slovak army formed the Union of Slovak Combatants (1953). 
Similar organizations sprung up in every Eastern and Central European diaspora, 
including the Free Armenia Committee, the Union of Estonian Fighters for Freedom, the 
Latvian Association for the Struggle against Communism and the Croatian National 
Liberation Movement, to name just a few. 
During the Cold War many of these organizations banded together under the banner 
of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). Inspired by the anti-colonial movements 
in Africa, the ABN was a coordinating center for anticommunist organizations dedicated 
to destroying the Warsaw Pact. Founded by the Bandera faction of the Organization for 
Ukrainian Nationalists, the ABN had US chapters in New York, Chicago, Detroit and 
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Cleveland. Though its rhetoric was on the fringe of the diaspora community, it was very 
prominent and highly mobilized.91 
The government was surprised by the intensity of the support for these programs 
and even sought to diminish thHLULPSDFW$WRSVHFUHWUHSRUWZDUQHG³$OODJHQFLHV
concerned with the VFC must be prepared to minimize the impact of pressures from the 
various émigré groups. Such pressure can be anticipated in direct approaches to members 
of Congress, to the participaWLQJDJHQFLHVDQGWRWKHSUHVV´92 In its attempt to improve 
relations with the USSR, the administration was deeply concerned with the possible 
impact of lobbying by extremist ethnic groups. This demonstrates the influence that 
geopolitically motivated selection mechanisms and political opportunities had in helping 
migrants mobilize into powerful lobbies. It also shows how the policy legacies of 
decisions dictated by world politics can backfire when the geopolitical situation changes. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the onset of the European migration and refugee crisis in 2015, it is 
somewhat ironic that concerns about the control of immigration should be rising at a time 
of ever increasing cross-border economic activity and declining geopolitical tensions.93 
However, in the United States the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent attacks 
by individuals residing in the country such as the Boston Marathon bombings of April 
2013 have highlighted the importance of migration for national security.94 The debate 
over the Israeli Lobby has also raised concerns about the influence of mobilized 
diasporas, especially when the policies advocated by these communities antagonize a 
region of the world crucial to U.S. security interests. This concern is in line with many 
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classical works of international relations that highlight the importance of migration for 
contributing to the rise and fall of the Roman Empire and to the development the United 
States and Russia in the nineteenth century.95 
Despite this tradition, migration has not played a particularly prominent role in 
contemporary studies. There are many possible reasons for this oversight, including the 
more pressing security issues posed by the Cold War and the innovations in military 
technology that make the contemporary world so dangerous. Rey Koslowski suggests that 
the issue of human movement has been bypassed ³EHFDXVHLWGRHVQRWHDVLO\ILWLQWRWKH
state-centric conceptualizations of world politics as an international system of territorially 
GHOLQHDWHGVWDWHV´96 This perspective is seconded by James Carafano, who blames the 
failure of the VFC on the ³U.S. predilection for state-focused solutions that largely 
ignored the role of civil society in building peace and stability´97 
By focusing on a case drawn from the early Cold war, my argument VHHNVWR³EULQJ 
WKHVWDWHEDFNLQ´E\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHLULQIOXHQFHRQGLDVSRUDPRELOL]DWLRQWKURXJKLWV
responses to the structure of the international system.98 The geopolitical concerns at the 
start of the Cold War led the United States to adopt immigration selection criteria that 
favored the admission hardline anticommunist migrants to America. Had the United 
States not screened applicants from East-Central Europe, it probably would still have 
received a broadly anticommunist population given the memories of expulsion carried by 
these individuals.99 However, this population would have displayed more diversity in the 
vehemence of its views and its willingness to act upon them. Overall, while lobbies 
would still have formed, they probably would have had fewer actively ideological ³FRUH
PHPEHUV´100 
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Although the problems of global terrorism that have brought migration into the 
spotlight of national security today differ from the case of postwar migration from East-
Central Europe in many ways, this case can still help us reflect on contemporary issues 
and theoretical concerns. Since the nineteenth century, Congress has restricted 
immigration using three main mechanisms: excluding individuals, favoring certain 
nationalities, and giving priority to certain individuals.101 While the criteria have 
changed, immigration officials continue to conduct interviews and vet potential 
immigrants. The Refugee Act of 1980 incorporates into U.S. law the first definition of 
refugees that is not ideologically or geographically based. However, it still searches for 
signs of persecution, which opens the possibility for the admittance of many individuals 
that share the deep-URRWHGSROLWLFDORSLQLRQVRI³FRUH´HWKQLFOREE\LVWV102 
In my study, geopolitical concerns about communist infiltrators after World War II 
resulted in the admission of fascists and other hardline anticommunists and provided 
them with the political opportunity to mobilize very quickly against the regime in their 
homelands. The lobbies they formed were the unforeseen result of policies designed to 
further US security. Today, it is undoubtedly in the American interest to implement 
immigration policies to keep terrorists out of the country. However, the long-term policy 
legacies of these selection criteria and the political opportunities that the current policy 
atmosphere offers must also be considered. 
While the debate about the Israeli lobby highlights how difficult it is to assess the 
success of diaspora lobbies, the influence of these migrant communities on the policies of 
their host states deserves further attention. This is particularly important in a country that 
wields global power like the United States. Immigration procedures produce structural 
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conditions in which motivated, politically active migrant communities can have a great 
impact lobbying the government, as well as by providing expertise and local knowledge 
of regions that few other Americans can dispute. 
In addition to lobbying, ethnic groups can also affect U.S. policy through their 
influence in the intelligence services and academia. It is difficult to judge the extent to 
which the use of former Nazi intelligence networks from Abwehr and the so-called 
³*HKOHQ*URXS´DIIHFWHG86Solicy, but the possibility is certainly disturbing.103 Within 
academia, the presence of foreign intellectuals with stridently anti-Soviet views at many 
American institutes and universities was also important. In some cases ± one need only 
think of individuals such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Pipes ± these individuals 
also crossed over from academia to take on important positions within the policy 
apparatus of the United States. Overall, the ideological commitments of intellectuals and 
policy-makers from the diaspora, who could claim direct knowledge of the communist 
system and the USSR, resulted in highly propagandized views of the Soviet Union that 
worked their way into U.S. policy.104 
Although the evidence in this paper is bounded both temporally and geographically, 
it raises important questions regarding the role of geopolitical factors in shaping the 
contours of human migration. With the end of the Cold War and rise of terrorism, the 
emphasis of research into migration policy has shifted from military technology to 
locating extremists within transnational networks. In this new security environment, the 
issues surrounding immigration vetting procedures and migrant radicalization are 
becoming more important. With this shift in international concerns, the topics theorized 
by scholars must shift as well. 
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Figure 1: 
The Elimination of Variation in the Political Views of Migrants through VettingÁ 
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